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ABSTRACT 
The concept of conditioning is well known in probability theory, where it is used 
in artificial intelligence to quantify the uncertainty of rules, but is totally absent 
from logic, where material implication is widely used to express conditional state- 
ments. This problem has intrigued several researchers in the past. This paper is both 
a survey of works pertaining to the introduction of conditioning relations in logic 
and a discussion about how these conditioning relations leave some room for non- 
monotonicity and might be useful in formalizing the concept of production rules 
in expert systems. Moreover, it is shown how this formal setting leads to generaliz- 
ing Cox's axiomatic approach to conditional probability. Conditional probability, 
possibility, and belief unctions are then obtained by solving functional equations. 
They obey the natural requirement that a conditional uncertainty measure be the 
measure of a conditional, such conditional being expressed as a conditioning rela- 
tion between propositions that may fail to coincide with material implication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are basically two ways of modeling " i f . . .  then" rules in artificial in- 
telligence: (1) material implication in theorem proving and logic programming 
and (2) production rules in expert system shells. However, perhaps due to the 
fact that, in logic programming, only Horn clauses are used, and disjunctive 
information is usually not directly processed as such, the two modes of repre- 
sentation are often thought of as equivalent, as is the case in Prolog programs, 
for instance. However, it is well known that material implication is a debatable 
tool for translating if-then statements. Namely, a ---, b £ --a V b is considered 
true when a is false, while a production rule "if  a then b" is not applicable 
in that case. Paradoxes of material implication have motivated the search for 
nonstandard logics. 
Another problem occurs when rules are pervaded with uncertainty and are 
assigned numbers uch as probability values. It is then interesting to note that lo- 
gicians and statisticians split into two groups: Logicians interpret these numbers 
as the probability of the material implication (see, eg, Nilsson [1]), whereas 
statisticians use conditional probabilities. The fact that a conditional probability 
P(a Ib) -~ P(a Ab)/P(b) is generally different from P(~b Va) has been noticed 
for a long time. Indeed we have 
P(b ~ a) - P(-O) 
P(alb) = 1 - P(~b) (1) 
In fact, P(alb) and P(-~b va) coincide if and only ifP(b) > 0 and P(~b Va) = 
1. Indeed, when P(b) = O, P(a]b) is undefined. The following relationships 
between P(a Ib) and P(~b Va) on {0, 1 } are readily checked, noting that P(~b V 
a) = P(a A b) +P(-~b): 
If P(a Ib) = 1, then P(-O V a) -- 1; the converse is true only if P(b) ~ O. 
If P(-O V a) = 0, then P(a Ib) = 0, 
but P(a[b) = 0 implies only P(-~b Va) < 1. 
These results emphasize the fact that P(alb) and P(--~ Va) do not coincide 
even on {0, 1 }. Although P(a Ib) and P(~b V a) are different, the inequality 
P(alb) < P(~b v a) holds whenever P(alb) makes ense, that is, i fP(b) # 0. 
Moreover, we have P(b ---+ a) = P(--a ~ ~b), while P(a [b) ~ P(-~b l-a) gen- 
erally. As a consequence, reasoning theories based on conditional probabilities 
are not easily related to classical logic. 
As noted by Schay [2], P(a Ib) is usually interpreted as "(probability of a) 
given b" rather than "probability of (a given b)," since "a given b" is not 
defined in logic. There has been some work in the past to define the measure- 
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free symbol alb in the framework of modal logic (especially Stalnaker [3]). 
However, the attempts to properly relate a Ib and P(a [b) have been unsuccessful 
with this approach (eg, Lewis [4], Harper et al [5]). More recently Calabrese 
[6], Goodman and Nguyen [7-10], and to some extent Dubois and Prade [11] 
have started to investigate he definition of a conditioning relation "a [b" outside 
any modal framework, admitting that it cannot be a logical proposition in the 
usual sense. The aim of Calabrese [6] is really to be able to define P(a [b) as the 
probability of something noted "a [b." In fact, these works have rediscovered 
preliminary findings that already appeared in an older, pioneering work by 
Schay [2] and can be traced back to De Finetti [12] in 1937. 
These attempts to introduce measure-free conditioning must be related to 
Cox's old axiomatic system [13], which intends to characterize the usual defini- 
tion of conditional probability on purely nonfrequentist grounds. This axiomatic 
system has been recently proposed as the formal proof of the inevitability of 
probability theory for uncertainty modeling by artificial intelligence researchers 
(Cheeseman [14, 15], Horvitz et al [16]). 
This paper has the following purposes: (1) to summarize the current work 
on measure-free conditionals with a view to providing the basis for a formal 
calculus of production rule systems, (2) to use these results so as to justify 
Cox's axiom defining conditional probability in a compositional way, and (3) 
to modify Cox's system in order to accommodate other types of uncertainty 
measures uch as possibility and belief functions, thus providing a sound basis 
for the definition of conditional measures. 
MEASURE-FREE CONDITIONING 
Basic Definitions and Truth Table Interpretation 
In the following, the symbol a [b is informally interpreted as representing 
a production rule "if b then a," which means "when b is true then a can 
be added to the set of facts (ie, b "produces" a), otherwise the rule is not 
applicable." Viewing a Ib as linking two propositions a and b of propositional 
logic, semantics can be given to it under the form of an incomplete truth table, 
namely denoting t the truth-assignment function, t(alb) = 1 when a and b 
are both true and t(a Ib) = 0 when a is false and b is true. When b is false, 
a[b is considered inapplicable, which is denoted as t(a[b) --?. This symbol 
means that any truth value in {0, 1} can be assigned to a lb. Such semantics 
are in accordance with the usual meaning of production rules; this proposal, 
which we made independently [11], turns out to be exactly equivalent to the 
definition by Schay [2]. Moreover, it explicitly appears in De Finetti's paper on 
subjective probability [12]. Table 1 is a truth table that exhibits the difference 
between b ---* a and a lb, while Table 2 is obtained by inverting Table 1 and 
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Table 1. Material Implication versus Conditioning Symbol 
t(b ) t(a) t(b~a) t(al b ) 
1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 ? 
0 0 1 ? 
shows the modus ponens behavior of the conditioning compared to the one of 
material implication. 
In [11] we also note that t(a[b) can be implicitly defined by means of the 
equation 
t(a A b) = t(a [b) • t(b) (2) 
where • is the conjunction operation on {0, 1 }, that is, . is such that 1 .1  -- 1 
and 1 *0 = 0 .1  = 0 ,0  = 0. Indeed i f t (a)  = 1 -- t(b), (2) entails t(a[b) = 1; if 
t(a) = 0 and t(b) = 1, (2) entails t(alb) = 0, while when t(b) = O, t(a[b) = 1 
as well as t(a [b) = 0 are compatible with (2). Minimum (min) and product are 
examples of possible choices for expressing the operation ,.  
Any proposition x such that t(a A b) := t(x) • t(b) can stand for a lb. Note 
that filling the incomplete truth table can be done in only four ways, equating 
alb to one of the propositions a A b, a, a ~ b, or b ~ a in a language 
containing only a and b as proposition symbols and assuming that t(a) and t(b) 
can be independently valued ( ~ is the equivalent symbol). The set {a A b, 
a, a ~ b, b ~ a } forms a partially ordered set under the entailment relation, 
with a A b and b ~ a being, respectively, the smallest and the greatest elements 
(while a and a ~ b are not comparable), a [b can be thus identified to a set of 
propositions, for instance {a A b, a, a ~ b, b ~ a} here, and " [ "  does not 
define a connective in the usual sense. 
At this point, it is interesting to give the two following definitions, where 
a,  b, x denote elements of a finite Boolean algebra 63. 
DEFINITION 1 (Goodman and Nguyen [9]) Va, b C 63, a [ab = {x, x Ab = 
aAb}. 
DEFINITION 2 (Calabrese [6]) Va, b ~ 63, a [c b = {x, ~r E O(b), x A r = 
a Ar} ,  whereO(b) -- {b Vs,  s E 6]}. 
It is easy to verify that (2) corresponds to the semantics of Definition 
1. Moreover, it can be established that Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent. 
Indeed, taking r = b shows that a [c b c_ a [c b. Conversely, noticing that 
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e A x = f entails 9t, x -----f V t and e A t = © (where ~) denotes the smallest 
element in (B), we conclude that if x E a Ic b, then x = [a A (b V s)] V t, 
with (bVs)  At  -- ©; that is, bat  = CO and sat  = ~. Finally we get 
x Ab  = ([a A(b  Vs)] Vt)  Ab  = [a A(b  Vs)] Ab - -a  Ab,  sox  Ea  lob. 
Note that a 16 b = {a A b, a, a +-+ b, b --+ a } as soon as it is required that x 
be a Boolean function of independent propositions a and b in Definition 1. By 
independent propositions, we mean that Vx E {a Ab, -a  Ab, a A ~b, --,a A-~b}, 
x ~ ~). However, in any case, a A b and b --+ a are the least and greatest 
elements, respectively, of a 1o b. Moreover, a ]ob = {a A b _< x _< -~b v a }, 
where _< denotes the usual partial ordering in the Boolean algebra, expressing 
entailment, that is, b _< a if and only if -~b V a = ~t, where 5t denotes the 
greatest element in (B. 
Conditioning and Rules of Production 
In the following we only use the notation a lb to denote the solutions of 
(2), and we call it a "production rule" that expresses that when b is observed 
or known to be true, a can be produced. This is in agreement with the under- 
standing of production rules used in expert systems [ 17]. Considering a Boolean 
algebra (B of propositions with tautology ft and contradiction ~), we can define 
the set (B[(B -- {aib, (a, b) E (B2}. (B can be identified as the subset {al~, 
a E (B}. Indeed, t(al~t) = t(a) from (2) (or from Table 1). Note that in the 
language of expert systems a subset 3£ of (B I(B is a knowledge base, 3£ M(B may 
be viewed as a factual base, and 3£ fq ((B I(B - (B) may be viewed as a rule base. 
Rules of the form a I~) are not very interesting since they are never applicable 
[t(al~) =?,  Va], as can be checked on Table 1. Besides, al a = O(a) = {x, 
a < x}, which contains a and ~; thus ala cannot be identified with ~t. This is 
natural since the rule a la is applicable only if a is known to be true, so that 
t(ala) E {1, ?}. More generally, i fa  ~ b = ~, then t(bla) ~ 0 only. 
Equality and Partial Ordering 
It can be shown that 
a Ib : c Id if and only if a A b = c A d and b = d (3) 
as proved by Calabrese [6]. Indeed, {x, xAb ---- aAb} = {(aAb) Vs, with sA  
b = ©}. When a Ab ~ c Ad ,  it is clear that a Ab f[ cld or c Ad  f[ alb while 
a Ab E a ]b and c Ad E c Id. Let us assume that a Ab = c Ad.  Then, if b ~ d ,  
3s, s Ab  = ~ and s Ad  ~ ~); it entails that alb # cld. Thus two rules a[b 
and c Id are equal if and only if they have the same applicability condition (ie, 
b -- d ) ,  and their conclusion parts are identical when the condition is satisfied 
(ie, a A b = c A b). This can also be readily checked using a truth table and is 
intuitively satisfactory. (3) was noted by De Finetti [12]. 
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The following equalities are worth noting and easy to check: 
alb = (a Ab)lb = (a ~b) lb  = (b ~a) lb  (4) 
They are in agreement with our interpretation of a Ib in terms of a production 
rule. Here we have four ways of describing the same rule. However, note 
that a A b, a ~ b, or b --+ a are not independent of b; then we cannot use 
for computing a A b Ib, for instance, the equality a Ib = {a A b, a, a ~ b, 
b ~ a} when restricting ourselves to Boolean functions, since it requires the 
independence of a and b. Indeed, 
(a A b) lb¢ {(a A b) A b, a A b,(a A b) ~ b, b ~ (a A b) } = {a A b, b ---, a } 
because (a A b)Ib also contains a and a ~ b. 
Since alb = {x, a Ab < x < ~b Va} and cld = {y, c Ad <_ y <_ ~d Vc}, 
the following natural partial ordering can be defined on (B I(B and will be also 
denoted by _< : 
a Ib _ c Id ~ a A b < c A d and -~b V a <_ -~d V c (5) 
This definition has already been used by Goodman and Nguyen [9]. The re- 
lation <_ defined by (5) is reflexive and transitive. Letting b = d = &, 
it appears that this definition extends the partial ordering in (B. In the rule 
interpretation this ordering relation corresponds to an entailment relation. In- 
deed, a A b < c A d means that each time a lb is true c ld is true also, and 
~b V a < -~d V c ~,  b A -a  >_ d A ~c means that each time c Id is false, a [b 
is false too. Then the rule a Ib entails the rule c [d. It can be checked that the 
equalities a A b = c A d and ~b v a -- -~d v c entail b = d, and then we have 
(alb <_cld and alb >c ld )~a lb  =c ld  
Besides, in terms of truth tables, the relation _< defined by (5) corresponds 
to the ordering 0 <? < 1, still using the same symbol "<"  between values of 
the truth function. It can be checked that a Ib _< c Id if and only if t(a Id) _< t(c Id) 
in all possible situations. In terms of rules, this partial ordering corresponds, as 
already said, to an entailment relation: If  we have the rule a Ib we also have the 
rule c Id, and it extends the fact that in classical ogic if a A b (resp. b ~ a) 
is true, then c A d (resp. d ~ c) is true provided that a A b <_ c A d (resp. 
b ~ a < d ---, c). In particular we have 
Vc, aJb <_ (a wc)Jb (6) 
which means that if the rule a Ib holds, any more imprecise conclusion a V c 
can also be produced. This is already the case with the material implication 
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since b ~ (a v c) is true as soon as b ~ a is. But, 
there is no universal ordering between a](b/x c) and a ]b (7) 
Indeed, a A b A c < a A b, but ~b V ~c V a _> -~b V~a. In other words, the 
rule a Ib may be true as well as false, while the rule a I(b A c) is not applicable. 
This contrasts with the material implication for which b ~ a true entails that 
(b A c) ~ a is true. It also contrasts with the entailment relation (<) in (B 
for which b <a implies b Ac <a.  We have b <a ~t(alb) E {?, 1}, ascan 
be easily checked on truth tables. But this does not cover the case where a 
is false when b is true. The statement of fact (7) corresponds to a form of 
nonmonotonicity. But it can be seen on truth tables that we cannot have the 
rules alb and -a  tb A c simultaneously true. However, a numerical uncertainty 
measure g compatible with the partial ordering in (B I(B will remain free, due 
to (7), to be such that g(alb Ac) < g(alb); see the following section. Thus we 
shall be able to capture a form of nonmonotonicity in this framework, which 
is in agreement with the rule interpretation, in commonsense knowledge (eg, 
generally birds fly, but special kinds of birds do not fly). 
Besides, we have the following ordering, which is easy to check: 
(a Ab)la _ alb <_ (-~b va)la (8) 
which enables us to compare alb with a Ab and with ~b Va in (BI(B in a way 
that is in agreement with our intuition. 
Finally, the following property, which is easy to check, expresses the com- 
patibility of the entailment relation _< with the union operation performed on 
the left side of the conditioning symbol "l ". 
ale =~(aVb)le <_(cVd)lf (9) 
<_clf 
b le <_ d If 
Statement (9) reduces to (6) for b = ~), c = a, d = c, e = b, f = b. 
Combination of Rules 
The problem of extending operations such as negation, intersection, and union 
to (BI(B has been addressed by Schay [2], Calabrese [6], and Goodman and 
Nguyen [9]. There is a consensus about negation, that is, 
-~(a Ib) = (-,a Ib) (lO) 
In terms of truth tables, this corresponds to extending the negation operation 
by postulating that t(--a) =? if t(a) =?. That is to say, -~(a Ib) corresponds to 
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the converse rule " i f  b then not a."  This is quite different from what happens 
with the material implication where -~(b -~ a) = b A --a ~ b ~ -a !  Here, the 
negation of a rule is another ule with the same condition of application and 
the opposite conclusion. It contrasts with the logic programming point of view 
where a conditional is expressed under the form of a clause ~b V a (whose 
negation is no longer a clause). Besides, this difference seems similar to the 
one between b k a (which is a bit like a Ib) and k b --, a, which are equivalent 
in classical ogic but not in many nonstandard systems. 
There exist three different proposals for defining the conjunction of (a Ib) and 
(cld), which may appear under various equivalent forms, since due to (4) there 
are at least four ways of describing the same rule (the forms used below are 
not necessarily the ones used by the author(s) who introduced the definitions). 
(alb) ^  (cld) = [(b ~ a) A (d ~ c)]l(b v d)  (Schay, Calabrese) (11) 
(alb) • (cld) = (a A c)l[(~a A b) v (~c A d)  v (b A d)] 
(Goodman and Nguyen) (12) 
(alb) n (cld) = (a A c)l(b A d)  (Schay) (13) 
In terms of truth tables it can be checked that these three definitions cor- 
respond to three possible extensions of the binary conjunction operation that 
preserve the symmetry and take into account he symbol ? introduced in Table 
1. This point is not really made clear by the authors who introduced the defi- 
nitions. Namely, using the same notations for combining propositions or their 
truth values, 
• (11) can be obtained by postulating 1^? = 1; 0^? = 0; ?^? =?. 
• (12) can be obtained by postulating 1.? =?; 0.? = 0; ?-? =?. 
• (13) can be obtained by postulating IN? =?; 0A? =?; ?N? =?. 
The main practical difference between definitions (11), (12), and (13) lies in the 
domain where the resulting rule is applicable, n being the most restrictive (it 
requires b A d true) and ^  being the least restrictive, while • is intermediary. 
From the point of view of rule-based systems, ^  means that the two rules a Ib 
and c Id are available and form a rule base. It is natural to define the applicability 
of a rule base {ai[bi, i = 1, n } to a factual base 5: whenever at least one rule i 
is applicable to 5:, that is, Vi=l, n bi is true. This remark emphasizes the natural 
appeal of operation ^  in the scope of rule-based systems. Note that n would 
mean in this interpretation that a rule base is applicable whenever all rules are 
applicable, which is not satisfactory. However, the operation n corresponds 
to the building, from two rules, of a rule with a more specific condition and a 
more specific conclusion. It means that if a (resp. c) is produced when b (resp. 
d) is known to be true, then the conjunction a A c can be produced when both 
b and d are known to be true. It is similar to the fact that in logic b --~ a and 
d -~ c entails (b A d)  --~ (a A c). However, due to (7), the rule a A c Ib A d 
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may be rejected when alb and c [d are correct. As stated earlier, conditions 
of applicability of (alb) • (c Id ) are intermediary; indeed it requires only either 
that both rules be applicable or that if only one of them is applicable, then its 
conclusion is false, as can be seen on (12). The definition (12) of the conjunction 
of two rules parallels the following identity, which holds in classical logic: 
(b~a)  A(d ~c)=[ (~aAb)V( -~cAd)V(bAd) ]~(aAc)  (14) 
However, the right-hand part of (14) does not appear to be a very natural ex- 
pression of the conjunction of the two implications b -~ a and d ~ c, although 
it expresses that the conjunction of the two conclusions can be deduced from 
b and d if the two implications are true and cannot be deduced if one of them 
is false. Similarly, the definition (12) is not intuitively appealing, at least using 
the rule interpretation. Indeed if t(a ]b) = 0 or t(c Id) = 0, the condition part 
of the resulting rule is satisfied, although this rule turns out to be false since 
then t((alb). (cld)) = 0! 1 But the conjunction of the two implications above 
can also be written equivalently as 
(b~a)  A(d ~c)=(bVd)~[ (aAc)V(aA~d)V(cA-~b) ]  (15) 
This latter writing seems more satisfactory from an intuitive point of view. It 
can be checked that 
[(a A c) V (a A ~d ) V (c A ~b)] I(b v d ) = [(b ~ a) A (d ---* c)] I(b v d ) 
using (~BVA)AB = A AB with B = b Vd and -~BVA = (b ~ a)A(d ~ c). 
Then the definition (11) has an equivalent form whose condition and conclusion 
parts respectively coincide with the condition and conclusion parts of the right- 
hand side of (15). This confirms the intuitive appeal of definition (11). Of 
course when b = d ,  (11), (12), and (13) coincide. 
The following identities or relations are worth noting. 
alb <_ cld 
(alb). (cld) 
(a A b)l~ 
(b m c)la 
(cl[a A b])^ (c I[a A -~b]) 
(alb). (cld) = (alb) (16) 
< (alb) ^  (cld); (alb) • (cld) < (a]b) fq (cld) (17) 
: (a lb )^ (b[~) = (alb). (b[~) (18) 
= (b la)^ (cl[a A b]) (19) 
= c la (20) 
1In classical logic, a system such as (~a A b) --, a, ~a A b is inconsistent, and then it does not 
really matter that you can formally produce a by modus ponens. The situation is perhaps more 
disturbing when the material implication is changed into a l~a A b, although this rule is either false 
or not applicable. 
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The equivalence (16) is used by Goodman and Nguyen [9] as defining the partial 
ordering; it, as well as (17) and (18), can be easily checked on truth tables. (19) 
is easy to prove. Indeed, (bla) ^ (cl[a Ab]) = ((a ~ b) A [(a Ab) ~ c])la --- 
[~a W(b A(~b V c))]la = [~ct W(b A c)]la = [a ~ (b A c)]la = (b Ac)[a due 
to (4). Obviously, (18) is a particular case of (19) (with a = ~ and c = a). 
The identity (19) is the symbolic ounterpart of a well-known (basic) relation 
between conditional probabilities, namely 
Prob(b Ac]a) = Prob(bla). Prob(c[a A b) 
Note that there is no ordering between (a ]b) A (c Id) and (a Ib) n (c Id). This is 
natural, since in the particular case where a = c these two expressions reduce 
to al(b v d) and al(b A d), respectively, and due to (7) there is no universal 
ordering between them. The equality (20) is easy to prove; indeed the left side 
of (20) is equal to 
([(a A b) ~ c] A [(a A ~b) -~ c])la = (a ~ c)la = c la 
using (4). Note that (20) has no perfect counterpart in probability theory. 
Disjunction operations can be derived using De Morgan's laws. For instance, 
the dual of A is (Calabrese [6]) 
(a Ib) v (c Id) = [(a A b) v (c A d )] I(b v d ) (21) 
It has been proposed by Schay under a different appearance. This disjunction 
produces a rule that can be triggered by disjunctive information, weaker than 
that which triggers alb or cld. Using (6), we deduce the ordering relation 
(alb) V (cld) 5 (a vc)l(b vd)  (22) 
since (a A b) V (c A d ) _< a V c. Thus the disjunction of two rules (in the sense 
of Xt) entails that if one of the conditions i  satisfied then at least one of a and 
c must be true, which is in agreement with intuition. Moreover, it can checked 
that we have the ordering relation 
(alb) A(cld) <_ (a[b) V(cld) (23) 
But no such relation exists between a]b and its disjunction or conjunction with 
another ule c [d. This is due to the fact that a ]b may be not applicable while 
old is; however, in this case we have the relations (alb) A (cld) < cld <_ 
(a Ib) v (c Id ) for the other rule. 
The corresponding disjunction operations on the truth function values are 
easily obtained by duality. Namely, Vx E {0, ?, 1 }, 
• xA? =x  =? Ax yields x~ =x =? Vx. 
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• x.? = rain(x, [0, 1]) =? • x yields x _L? -- max(x, [0, 1]) =? _1_ x, where 
[0, 1] is identified with ?. 
• xn? --? =? Nx yields xU? =? =? Ux. 
Note that ?, with respect to both A and V, plays the role of a neutral element 
(it has been called a "nought element" by Sanchez [18], who considered it for 
discussing a problem of importance weighting in information retrieval), while ? 
is a universally absorbing dement with respect to both fq and U. Besides, the 
pairs (A, V), (., _L), (N, U) were first considered in the framework of trivalent 
logics, as conjunction and disjunction operations, by Sobocinski, Lukasiewicz, 
and Bochvar, respectively; see Rescher [19]. 
Schay [2] indicates that V and ^  are not distributive with respect to each other, 
so (BI(B is no longer a Boolean algebra. See also Calabrese [6]. Moreover, 
the algebraic structure of ((BI(B, A, V,. ,  _L, N, U, ~) is still to be investigated. 
Let us mention the distributivity of A with respect to ,L, that is, a Ib A (c Id ,L 
e l f )  = (alb Acid) _L (alb ^ e l f ) ;  this is no longer true for n with respect o 
_L. 
Finally, it is interesting to iterate the conditioning process in such a way 
that (B I(B remains closed under this process. The following definition is natural 
(Calabrese [6]): 
(alb)tc -- al(b A c) (24) 
Indeed, "if  c is true then (if b is true then a is produced)" means that b and 
c are the conditions required to produce a. In terms of truth tables, (24) is 
obtained with the convention ? l0 =? =? I 1 (using the same symbol " l"  for 
propositions and for values of the truth function). However, the companion 
expression al(blc) is less easy to interpret. Two meanings can be envisaged. 
1. If b Ic is true, then a is produced. That is to say, if when c is true, b is held 
for true, then a is produced. This is equivalent to letting I be associative 
and al(blc) = al(b A c). It corresponds to the convention 1I? =? -- 01?. 
2. If blc is not false, then a is produced. Note that this means that a is 
produced as long as b lc is acceptable as a rule (even a nonapplicable 
one), that is, it sounds like a metarule (a rule depending upon rules). 
That is to say, if ~(c A -~b) is true, then a is produced. In that case I is 
not associative and a I(b Ic) -- a I(c ---, b). This is Calabrese's definition. 
It corresponds to set 1 l? = 1 and 01? = 0. 
This problem leads to alternative definitions for the conditioning between rules: 
(alb)l(cld) = al(b A c A d) (associative definition) or al[b A (d ~ c)] (second 
point of view). Goodman and Nguyen [9] propose to define ((alb)l(cld)) by 
again applying Definition 1 [using the conjunction defined by (12)]. This pro- 
posal, if formally sound, leads to an infinite expansion process where intuition 
may be lost. 
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CONDITIONAL MEASURES OF UNCEI~FAINTY 
A measure of uncertainty on a Boolean algebra (B is a function g: (B ~ [0, 1] 
that assigns to each proposition a c (B a degree g(a) such that g(~l) = 1, 
g(0) = 0, and g(a) >_ g(b) whenever a is entailed by b (ie, b < a). The fact 
that 6~ is a Boolean algebra forbids the compositionality of g over 63 as soon as 
g takes values other than 0 and 1; that is, there is no isomorphism • between 
6~ and [0, 1] such that 
Va, g(--a) = ~(g(a) )  (25) 
Va, Vb, g(a A b) = ~b^(g(a), g(b)) (26) 
Va, Vb, g(a v b) = ~v(g(a) ,  g(b)) (27) 
See [20] for a detailed discussion. For instance, if g is a probability measure, 
then g(a A b) = g(a) • g(b) assumes stochastic independence and does not 
hold in general (eg, if b = ~a); moreover, g(a v b) = g(a) + g(b) requires 
g(a A b) = O. 
The fact that (B 163 is no longer a Boolean algebra allows compositionality 
of measures of uncertainty acting on conjunctions of the form a A b, when 
decomposed as (a [b)^b, in the sense of (18). Indeed, what creates problems 
on (B for an identity like g(a A b) = g(a) .g(b)  is that when a = b we 
get g(a) = g(a).g(a),  which forces g(a) = 1 as soon as . ~ min. And a 
probability measure that satisfies min(g(a),  g(b)) = g(a A b), Va, b, is a Dirac 
measure [since min(g(a), g(--a)) = 0, Va]. On the contrary the idempotence 
of ^ no longer creates a problem when a Ib and b are combined, since Vb, 
(bib) ¢ b, if b ¢ ~t. Then it becomes consistent o state a decomposability 
axiom of the form 
A1 g(a A b) = g(alb) * g(b) 
identifying a Abl~t with a Ab and blot with b. By convention, g(alb) is defined 
only when t(alb ) ~ ?; moreover, g(alb) = 0 when t(alb) -- 0. Then g( • [b) 
defines a monotonic function (a < c) ~ g(a [b) < g(c Ib)) with g(b lb) = 1. 
Besides, it would be desirable to have the following monotonicity property 
satisfied: 
A0 alb < cld ~ g(alb) <_ g(cld) 
due to the understanding of the partial ordering < in terms of entailment in the 
rule interpretation. Note that A0 implies the following noticeable inequalities 
when g(a Ib) is defined. 
g(a Ab)  <<_g(alb) < g(b --~a) (28) 
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The Probabilistic Case 
Axiom A1 has been proposed by Cox [13], along with the two following 
axioms. 
A2 g(--a) -- S(g(a)) 
,4,3 • and S have continuous econd-order derivatives. 
As pointed out by Cox [ 13], the compatibility of  A 1 with the Boolean structure 
entails that • should be associative. Under assumptions A1, A2, and A3, this 
author proves that * is the product, S(x) = 1 -x  (up to an isomorphism), and 
that g is a probability measure. It can be shown (see first section of Appendix) 
that conditional probability satisfies A0, as already stated by Goodman and 
Nguyen [9]. 
As noticed by Heckerman [21], A3 can be relaxed into continuity and strict 
increasingness of • in each place. Then • =product is still the only solution of 
A1, due to results in functional equations by Aczel [22]. These arguments have 
been proposed as a proof of the uniqueness of  probability measures as proper 
measures of uncertainty. This is questionable because axiom A2 implicitly re- 
jects all representations of uncertainty based on two degrees [II(a), C(a)] distin- 
guishing between ideas of  possibility and certainty, for which II(a) = S(C(--a)) 
replaces A2 and means that certainty of  a [C(a) = 1] is equivalent to the im- 
possibility of  --,a [H(--a) = 0]. Besides, the properties of • can be relaxed to 
a simple increasingness in the wide sense, in which case any triangular norm 2 
can be a candidate. More specifically we consider three relaxations of A3: 
A3'  * is continuous and strictly monotonic in both places (ie, a strict- 
triangular norm isomorphic to product). 
A3" * is continuous and isotonic, that is, x > x '  and y > y '  =~ x .y  > 
x I , f .  
A3'"  • is a continuous triangular norm. 
As for operation S, we must keep the strict decreasingness in A2, due to the 
involutive property [ie, g(a) -- S o S(g(a)), Va], and it is known (Trillas [24]) 
that S(x) = 1 -x  up to an isomorphism in [0, 1]. 
We prove the following results (see Appendix): 
1. * = minimum is compatible with A1 and A2, but it leads to a function 
g that may fail to be decomposable, in the sense that 2~-L, Va, Vb, 
g(a V b) = g(a) d_ g(b) if a A b = ~); it contrasts with probability and 
possibility measures. 
2A triangular norm is a binary operation • defined in [0, 1], such that (i) * is associative; 0i) * is 
commutative; (iii) x < y and z _< t ~ x * z _< y * t; (iv) 0 * 0 = 0; x * 1 = x. There are mainly 
three kinds of continuous triangular norms, whose prototypes are respectively x * y --- rain(x, y), 
x *y =xy, and x *y = max(0, x +y - 1). See Schweizer and Sklar [23]. 
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2. Nilpotent riangular norms such as x * y = max(0, x + y - 1) are not 
compatible with A1. 
These results tend to indicate the reasonableness of the strict monotonicity as- 
sumption for operation • in conjunction with A1 and A2. 
Moreover, it can be established that the only possible candidate for • when g 
is a probability measure is the product, assuming only the nondecreasingness of 
• with respect to its first argument. Indeed the summation of the two equalities 
and 
Prob(a A b) = Prob(a Ib) * Prob(b) 
leads to 
Prob(--a A b) = Prob(--a Ib) • Prob(b) 
Prob(b) = Prob(a Ib) • Prob(b) + (1 - Prob(a [b)) * Prob(b) 
that is, to the functional equation 
x =y  .x  +(1 -y )*x  
It was proved by Alsina [25] that the general solution of this equation (which he 
encountered when discussing connectives for fuzzy sets) is the product provided 
that • is an associative binary operation on [0, 1] that is nondecreasing in its 
first variable. This result clearly proves, if needed, that solutions to A1, A2, 
and A3" (with • = min) cannot be probability measures. 
Conditioning in Evidence and Possibility Theories 
From now on, we relax assumption A2, and we define two types of measures 
of uncertainty, called the certainty measure (denoted C) and the plausibility 
measure (denoted II), which obey the following conventions: 
C (a) _< II(a) (29) 
C (a) = 1 ~ C ( -a )  = 0 (30) 
C (a) = 1 - H(--a) (31) 
The inequality (29) means that certainty demands more than mere possibility. 
(30) means that if a is certain then ~a cannot be certain to the least degree. 
(31) is the classical duality relationship between certainty and possibility that was 
recalled earlier. (31) could be weakened into C (a) = S(II(-~a)) where S must be 
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involutive and strictly decreasing, that is, S(x) = 1 -x  up to an isomorphism, 
once again. Clearly (29) and (31) imply (30) and also C(a) + C(--a) < 1, 
H(a) + H(--a) > 1. C (a) = C (--a) = 0 [equivalently, H(a) = H(--a) = 1] 
is permitted and expresses total ignorance about a (lack of certainty). On the 
contrary, II(a) = 0 means impossibility of a, which by (31) implies and is 
implied by C(--a) = 1, that is, certainty about --a. Note that (29)-(31) are 
weaker than A2 [or (25)]. Hence as long as A1 and A2 are consistent with 
the structure of (B [(B, A1 along with (29)-(31) will be consistent with it too. 
Examples of functions H are Zadeh's possibility measures [26], Sharer [27]'s 
plausibility functions, and upper probabilities [28], while C can be necessity 
measures, belief functions, or lower probabilities. 
A first question regarding the conditioning is whether we apply A1 to both 
C and II or to one of them only (and then to which one). It is easy to see that 
if H(a Ib) satisfies 
H(a A b) = II(a Ib) * H(b) 
then, due to (31), C(--alb) is a solution to the equation 
(32) 
1 - C ( - -a  V -~b) = (1 - C ( -mlb) )  • (1 - C ( -~b))  
For instance, if • -- product, 
(33) 
C (--,a Ib) = C (--,a v ~b) - C (~b) 
1 - C (--,b) 
If we further want the counterpart of (32) for C, we should have 
C (a Ab) = C (alb) . C (b) (34) 
But imposing that (33) and (34) must define the same conditional certainty is 
a strong requirement. We are back to Eq. (1) with C instead of probability. 
Generally, solutions to (33) and (34) will be different. Hence the conditioning 
axioms should be preferably independently specified. If we choose to define 
C (a Ib) by (34) where • must clearly be a triangular norm, we find that C (a Ib) 
is undefined as soon as C (b) = 0 [ =# C (a A b) = 0], that is, as soon as b 
is completely uncertain; in contrast, in the set (BI(B, alb is inapplicable only 
when b is false. As a consequence, (32) seems to be preferable to (34) as H(a Ib) 
[hence C (a Ib)] is not defined only when b is impossible. These remarks point 
out the fact that solutions.to (33) and (34) will be different, since they are not 
defined under the same coriditions. 
Note that (32) or (34) enables extensions of the Bayes theorem to be stated; 
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for example, 
C (a [b) * C (b) = C (b ]a) • C (a) 
H(alb) • II(b) = II(bla) • II(a) 
(35) 
(36) 
But as noted by Suppes and Zanotti [29], Eq. (35) forbids any updating of 
C(b) into C (b la) when C (b) = 0, that is, with an initial state of knowledge 
expressing total ignorance, while Eq. (36) permits uch an updating. Indeed in 
that case II(b) = 1 and II(b la) is obtained by solving the equation II(a Ib) = 
II(b la) * II(a). 
The following results hold for the axiom system: 
B1 Yl(a A b) = I I(a [b) • H(b).  
B2 C(a)  = 1 - H(--a).  
B3 • is an isotonic triangular norm (this is motivated by the incompatibility 
result of the third section of the Appendix) 
• The main solutions for • are the product and minimum. 
• For * -- minimum, we obtain (see [30]) 
If II(a Ab) < H(b), then II(alb) = H(a Ab); 
If II(a A b) = II(b), then II(a Ib) is freely chosen in [II(b), 1]. It is conve- 
nient o define II(a Ib) : 1 in that case by consistency with the probabilistic 
case, and the principle of minimum specificity [31], which expresses that 
possibility degrees hould remain as large as possible provided they do not 
violate the existing constraints. 
This definition of conditional possibility was first proposed by Hisdal [32] and 
subsequently used by Dubois and Prade [11, 30]. An advantage of the choice 
, = minimum is a reconciliation between the material implication and the 
conditional a lb. Indeed, we have 
c (alb) = { C (b ---, a) i fC (b  ~a)  > C(~b) 
0 if C (b ~ a) = C (-~b) 
Then it is easy to check that the requirement A0 is satisfied by FI and C, 
taking II(alb) -- II(b) when II(a A b) = II(b) and C(alb ) = C(--~) when 
C (b ~ a) = C (-,b). Besides, if we take II(a Ib) -- 1 when H(a A b) -- II(b) 
[and dually C (a Ib) = 0 if C (b ~ a) = C (-~b)], A0 is still satisfied if H is a 
possibility measure and C the dual necessity measure. 
Proof Indeed, we have only to make sure that II(a Ib) = 1 entails H(c Id) -- 
1. For any plausibility function II we have H(b) > max[II(a Ab), H(--a Ab)]. 
If H(a A b) = H(b), it entails that II(a A b) > H(--a A b). If a Ib <_ c Id, the 
monotonicity of II and the transitivity lead to H(c A d)  > H(-~c A d)  since 
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a A b _< c A d and -a  A b _> -~ A d .  Then if H is a possibility measure 
(Zadeh [26]), we have I I (d)  = max[H(c Ad) ,  II(--c Ad)]  = II(c Ad) ,  that 
is, II(c [d ) -- 1. Dually, it can be shown that C (c I d ) = 0 entails C (a [b) = 0. 
For , = product we obtain Shafer's proposal, I I(a [b) = I I(a A b)/II(b), 
which is consistent with Dempster's rule of combination (and with A0, since 
the proof of the appendix for probability still applies). However, as noticed 
by Kyburg [28], if 11 is an upper probability function, H(.lb) is generally not 
an upper conditional probability, that is, I I(aib) < max{P(aib)iP(a A b) E 
[C (a A b), I I(a A b)], P(b) E [C (b), II(b)] }. C (a [b) is easily computed from 
I I ( -a  [b). A0 is still satisfied if I I  is a possibility measure. The proof is similar 
to that of the probabilistic ase; the result is, in fact, much more general, since 
it can be shown that A0 is satisfied when II is a plausibility function in the 
sense of Shafer [27], that is, for a family of functions that encompass both 
probability and possibility measures (see Appendix, first section). 
As pointed out by Smets [33], C (a Ib) : C (b -~ a) is again valid whenever 
C (b) = 0, that is, for a wider range of situations than with standard probability 
measures. 
Note Weber [34, 35] has recently investigated conditional measures i sued from de- 
composable measures (in the sense mentioned above) based on Archimedean triangular 
conorms Z.3 It would be interesting to see if these conditional measures are in agreement 
with the framework discussed in this paper. It is a topic for further esearch. 
CONCLUSION 
Several ines of research can be contemplated from the above results: 
• On the side of symbolic reasoning, the consideration of the set 6~163 may 
lead to a rigorous, formal treatment of production rules in the context of 
logic; in particular, it enables us to capture the nonmonotonicity of rules 
alb. 
• On the side of numerical reasoning, the axiomatic setting by Cox, once 
relaxed to encompass possibility measures and belief functions (and other 
uncertainty measures that allow for the representation of ignorance) can 
serve as a basis for a theory of belief updating that parallels the one devel- 
oped by Heckerman [21] in a probabilistic setting. This topic is important 
since an uncertain production rule can sometimes be viewed as a belief 
updating operator. 
• It may be interesting to bridge the gap between the logical view of condi- 
3A triangular conorm _1_ is obtained from a triangular norm • by letting x ± y = l -(1 -x) * (1 - 
y); it is Archimedean if we have x ± x > x for x E (0, 1). 
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tioning developed here and past studies on comparative (qualitative) condi- 
tional probabilities (Fine [36, chap. 2]; Krantz et al [37, chap. 5]). The lat- 
ter approaches start with a weak order (expressing "more probable than") 
among conditional objects a Ib and state axioms this ordering should intu- 
itively satisfy in order to find conditional probabilities as its unique numer- 
ical counterpart. The ordering relation introduced in this paper [defined 
by (5)] is not a weak order because it does not satisfy the connectedness 
property (ie, a [b _< c Id or c Id _< a Ib for any a, b, c, d ). The qualitative 
probability relations considered by Fine [36] or Krantz et al [37] are indeed 
consistent with but stronger than the relation _< considered here. 
APPENDIX 
Compatibility of Conditional Plausibility Functions with Respect to the 
Partial Ordering (Case of the Product) 
Proof Let g be a plausibility function in the sense of Shafer [27]. By defi- 
nition, a Ib <_ c Id ¢=~ a A b _< c A d and ~b v a < -~d V c, and then it entails 
g(a A b) < g(c A d) and g(-~b V a) << g(-~d V c) since g is monotone. The 
latter inequality can also be written g(~a A b) >_ g(d A ~c). 
(i) case of  a probability measure g = P We have 
P(~a A b) > P(~c A d) 
P(a Ab) - P(c Ad)  
and hence P(a [b) < P(c Id) since 
1 
P(a[b) = 1 +P(-~a Ab) /P(a  Ab) 
(ii) case of  a possibility measure g = II 
1 II(b) max[II(a A b), II(--a A b)] 
Yl(a [b) II(a A b) II(a A b) 
and then II(a Ib) <_ II(c [d ). 
= max rl, II(-.a Ab)] 
 Td-s j [ 
(iii) case of  a general plausibility measure g = PI 
1 Pl(b) 
Pl(a [b) Pl(a A b) 
Pl(a A b) + re(e) 
e Ab ~)  
e Aa Ab=O 
Pl(a A b) 
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where m is the basic probability assignment associated to P1, that is, Pl(a) = 
~a^b4, m(b). Then a sufficient condition for guaranteeing Pl(a [b) < Pl(c]d) 
is the inequality 
m(e) >_ Z m(f) 
eAb#@ fad #@ 
e AaAb=@ fAcAd =@ 
This holds since m is nonnegative and there are more terms in the left-hand 
sum; indeed, 
• fAcAd- - - -~ofAaAb=@becauseaAb_<cAd.  
• The focal elements f that are taken into account in the right-hand part of 
the above inequality are such that f A -~c A d # ©, and are also such that 
f A --a A b # @ (since -a  A b > ~c A d),  hence they satisfy f A b # @.11 
Compatibility of • = Minimum with A1 and A2 
Axiom A1 yields 
g(a A b) = min[g(a ]b), g(b)] 
g(--a A b) -- min[g(--alb), g(b)] 
Then it has the consequence 
Va, Vb, g(a A b) < g(b) and g(--a A b) < g(b) 
g(a /x b) = g( ~b V a) = g(a) (C) 
Indeed, g(a A b) < g(b), g(--a A b) < g(b), and A2 entails 
g(a A b) = g(a Ib) -- S(g(--a Ib)) -- S(g(--a A b)) = g(~b v a) -- g(a) 
The last equality is due to the monotonicity of g with respect o the partial 
ordering in (B. Similarly we have, changing a into -~a, 
g(--ct Ab) <g(b)  and g(a Ab) <g(b)  =¢, g ( -a  Ab) = g( -a )  
and 
g(a A -,b) < g(~b) 
g(a A ~b) = g(a) 
and g(---a A ~b) < g(~b) ::~ 
and g(--a A ~b) = g(--a) 
Letting g(a) = ot and g(b) =/3, these conditions can be written as 
ot < min[B, S(~)] and S(o0 < min[B, S(/3)] 
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which is impossible. Then we should have 
Va,Vb,g(b) = max[g(a A b), g ( -a  A b)] 
or g(-~b) -- max[g(a A ~b), g(~a A ~b)] 
Note that we cannot have these two equalities imultaneously for any a or b, 
since then g would be a possibility measure, which is not compatible with A2. 
Starting with a function g that satisfies condition (C), it is always possible to 
define g(alb ) consistently with A1 and A2. Indeed, due to A1 we should have 
g(a Ib) = g(a A b) 
> g(a A b) 
if g(b) < g(a A b) 
if g(b) = g(a A b) 
g(--alb) =g(~a Ab) if g(b) <g( -a  Ab) 
> g(~a A b) if g(b) = g(--a A b) 
together with A2, that is, g(~a [b) = S(g(a Ib)). Four cases have to be distin- 
guished: 
g(a Ab)  < g(b) 
g(~aAb)  < g(b) 
g(alb) = g(a) 
) 
(g ( -a lb )  = g(~a) 
due to (C) 
g(a Ab) < g(b) 
g(---a A b) = g(b) 
g(a Ib) = g(a A b) 
g(~a Ib) = g(~a V ~b) >_ g(~a A b) 
g(a Ab) ---- g(b) 
g(~a A b) < g(b) 
g(--alb) = g( -a  Ab) 
g(aJb) = g(a v-~b) > g(a A b) 
g(a Ab) =g(b)  
g( -a  A b) = g(b) 
f g(a Ib) _ g(a A b) = g(b) 
t g(-alb) _> g(~a Ab) = g(b) 
=~ ~ g(a A b) --- g(b) <_ g(alb) <_ g(~b) = g(a v ~b) 
t g(--a A b) =- g(b) < g( -a  Ib) < g(~b) = g(-~a v -~b) 
Thus it is possible to define g(a Ib) consistently with A1 and A2 when (C) holds. 
An example of a function g that satisfies (C) and Va, g(~a) -- S(g(a)) is given 
now. 
g(a A b) = .7 
g(~a A b) = .3 
g(b)=.75 g((~aAb) V(aA~b))=.3 g(-~aV~b)=.3 
g(~b)~.25  g((a A b) v ( -a A ~b))=.7 g(a v -~b)=.7  
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g(a A -0) = .2 g(a) = .7 g(©) = 0 
g(--a A ~b) -- .25 g(~a) = .3 g(f[) = 1 
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g(-a Vb) ~- .8 
g(a v b) -~ .75 
g is not decomposable since g(a Ab) = g(a) = 0.7, g ( -a  Ab) -~ g( -a )  = 
0.3, but g(b)  = 0.75, while g(~[) = 1! 
Incompatibility of a Nilpotent Triangular Norm with A1 (and A2) 
In the case of a nilpotent riangular norm such as x *y  -- max(0, x ÷y  - 1) 
(see [23]), A1 can be written in the form 
f (g (a  A b)) = f (g (a  Ib)) + f (g (b) )  
where f is a strictly decreasing function such that f (0)  = 1 and f (1)  -- 0. 
Letting b -- -m, we get 
f(O) = f (g (a  I--a)) + f (g (b) )  
Since it seems natural to require that Va, g(al-~a) = 0 (indeed it corresponds 
to a rule that is always false when applicable), we conclude that 
Vb ?6 ¢), f (g (b) )  ~- O, that is, g(b) -- 1 
This is the total ignorance function of possibility theory, which is not compatible 
with A2 [since S(g(¢))) -- S(0) = 1 = S(g(~))]. • 
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